Brian Bond v.;City of Bethlehem by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-21-2012 
Brian Bond v.;City of Bethlehem 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Brian Bond v.;City of Bethlehem" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 131. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/131 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











CITY OF BETHLEHEM 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 5-10-cv-06739) 
District Judge:  Honorable Luis Felipe Restrepo 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 16, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 21, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Brian Bond appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of 




 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 Bond worked for the City of Bethlehem for nearly 14 years.  He dated a fellow 
City employee, Gina Bullard.  Bond and Bullard ended their relationship on August 18, 
2008, which led to a torrent of churlish behavior by Bond.  For example, Bond sent text 
messages that referred to Bullard as a “whore.”  In response, Bond received life-
threatening phone calls from Bullard’s new boyfriend.  Eventually a court in Carbon 
County granted Bullard a protection from abuse order, which Bond ignored on at least 
two occasions, including once in the parking lot of City Hall.  He was suspended from 
work while the City began its investigation of the incident. 
 The City’s violence in the workplace policy prohibits “behaviors such as direct 
threats, threatening behavior, harassing by phone, email or personal interaction.”  
Violation of this policy “may lead to disciplinary action, demotion, reassignment, 
suspension, dismissal, arrest or prosecution.”  In addition, the City’s sexual harassment 
policy prohibits excessively offensive remarks and inappropriate use of sexually explicit 
or offensive language.  On the basis of these policies and the City’s code of ethics, the 
City’s investigation concluded that Bond could be terminated for just cause.  However, 
because Bond had worked for the City for 13 years without disciplinary problems, the 
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City offered him a “last chance” agreement.  The agreement provided that Bond could 
avoid termination if he agreed to a 20-day suspension without pay, random drug testing, 
and mandatory counseling.  In addition, if Bond were to be convicted of a criminal 
charge in connection with the incident that occurred in the City Hall parking lot, then the 
City would immediately terminate him.  Bond’s union president advised him to refuse the 
agreement.  Bond refused and was subsequently terminated.  Six months following his 
termination, he pled guilty to harassment and stalking.  Bond sued the City of Bethlehem 
in the District Court alleging gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 951-963.  In addition, he alleged that he was terminated without procedural due 
process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The District Court granted the City’s motion 
for summary judgment, which Bond now appeals. 
II. 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Title VII claim and 
§ 1983 claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of an order 
granting summary judgment is plenary.  Callison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material fact exists 
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and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 
III. 
 Bond submits that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the 
City because (A) he established a prima facie case of gender discrimination, (B) the 
lower court based its decision upon an incomplete record, and (C) he was denied due 
process with respect to his termination.  We address each of these assertions in turn. 
A. 
 First, Bond claims that he established a prima facie case of gender discrimination 
in violation of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act (“PHRA”).  Because 
Pennsylvania courts have construed the protections of the two statutes interchangeably, 
the analysis is identical.  See Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Under either statute, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he is a member of a 
protected minority, (2) he is qualified for the position in question, (3) he has suffered an 
adverse employment action despite being qualified, and (4) the circumstances raise an 
inference of unlawful discrimination.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
802 (1973); see, e.g., Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Only then does the burden shift to the defendant to “articulate some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason” for its action.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
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 With respect to claims of reverse discrimination – where a plaintiff cannot 
demonstrate membership in a protected minority – the plaintiff must instead address the 
first prong by presenting sufficient evidence “to allow a fact finder to conclude that the 
employer is treating some people less favorably than others based upon a trait that is 
protected under Title VII.”  Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Plaintiffs who demonstrate less favorable treatment based upon a trait that is protected 
under Title VII can show that the circumstances raise an inference of unlawful 
discrimination by “presenting sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to 
conclude (given the totality of the circumstances) that the defendant treated plaintiff ‘less 
favorably than others because of [his] . . . sex’”  Id. at 163 (quoting Furnco Const. Corp. 
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). 
 Bond has failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of 
gender discrimination.  Specifically, Bond has not demonstrated that the City refused to 
terminate similarly situated female employees, i.e., female employees that violated the 
City’s violence in the workplace policy, sexual harassment policy, and code of ethics.  As 
evidence of less favorable treatment, Bond submits that the City terminated him, but did 
not terminate Bullard.  On its face, contends Bond, this disparity in treatment 
demonstrates that the City has discriminated on the basis of gender.  However, Bond was 
subject to multiple protection from abuse orders, he admitted to sending text messages 
during work hours that were designed to annoy and alarm Bullard, and was charged with 
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– and ultimately pled guilty to – harassment.  As the District Court acknowledged, the 
record does not show that Bullard engaged in similar conduct.1
B. 
  Bond and Bullard were 
therefore not similarly situated.  Bond has not demonstrated that the City refused to 
terminate similarly situated female employees.  As a result, Bond has not established a 
prima facie case of gender discrimination. 
 Bond now notes on appeal that the District Court ordered the deposition of 
Bullard, which was never taken.  Critically, Bond contends, he has not been “given a 
reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion,” contrary 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d).  As a result, according to Bond, the District 
Court based its decision upon an incomplete record. 
 However, Title VII and the PHRA place the burden upon Bond to establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Weston, 251 
F.3d at 425 n.3.  Bond could have deposed Bullard or any other City employee within the 
discovery period.  He did not.  Bond incorrectly alleges that the District Court 
erroneously based its decision upon an incomplete record.  Actually, the District Court 
                                              
1 Bond notes that the record reveals that Bullard used a City fax machine and City 
computer during her working hours to file complaints against Bond.  He also submitted 
evidence to the District Court that Bullard brought a handgun into City Hall in violation 
of City policies.  Nonetheless, Bond admitted that he intended to annoy, alarm and 
frighten Bullard.  Bullard alleges that she brought a handgun for protection.  Although 
Bullard was not charged with a crime, Bond was charged with harassment.  We agree 
therefore with the District Court that Bond and Bullard did not engage in similar conduct. 
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based its decision upon the fact that Bond had failed to meet his burden under Title VII 
and the PHRA. 
C. 
 Lastly, Bond submits that he was denied procedural due process with respect to his 
termination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  A plaintiff establishes a claim for 
deprivation of procedural due process rights by proving that “(1) he was deprived of an 
individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of 
life, liberty, or property, and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide due 
process of law.”  Hill v. Borough of Kurtztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(internal quotation omitted).  The City does not contest that Bond has a property interest 
in his continued employment, and we therefore focus on whether Bond could avail 
himself of procedures consistent with § 1983. 
 The guiding principle of procedural due process is that any deprivation of property 
should be preceded by notice and opportunity to be heard.  Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
Loudermill, 477 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).  Public employees are entitled to “notice of the 
charges against [them], an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to 
present [their] side of the story” before their employment is terminated.  Id. at 546.  The 
“root requirement” of procedural due process under Loudermill is “that an individual be 
given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property 
interest.”  470 U.S. at 542. 
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 Bond contends that his Loudermill hearing applied to the suspension of his 
employment and not his termination.  Thus, according to Bond, his due process rights 
were violated because he was not given a second Loudermill hearing before his 
termination.  He is mistaken.  Bond was given notice of possible termination in a pre-
deprivation hearing.  His suspension and termination derive from the same events.  At the 
hearing, Bond had an opportunity to present his side of the story and admitted that he had 
sent the harassing text messages.  Thus Bond’s termination was preceded by notice and 
explanation of the underlying charges against him and an opportunity to respond to those 
charges.  A second hearing was not required.  See id. at 546. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
